Sistemas de recompensas e comprometimento com a meta grupal o papel da dificuldade da meta e da necessidade de pertencer a equipe
Sistemas de recompensas e comprometimento com a meta grupal [recurso eletrônico] : o papel da dificuldade da meta e da necessidade de pertencer a equipe / Celliane Ferraz Pezatto ; orientadora, Ilse Maria Beuren ; coorientador, Jacobo Gómez-Conde
Data de publicação
2024
Descrição física
163 p. : il.
Nota
Disponível somente em versão on-line.
Tese (doutorado) – Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro Socioeconômico, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Contabilidade, Florianópolis, 2024.
Inclui referências.
Versão integral em pdfAbstract: This thesis conducts an experiment to analyze the effects of reward systems’ design on team goal commitment, and the influences of goal difficulty and the need-to-belong to the team. The reward system influences decision making based on the expectation of monetary gains contingent upon (i) individual performance or (ii) group/average performance. It was postulated that under group reward systems, with equitable division of the reward, individuals would act aligned and interested for group gains, which would result in greater team cohesion and would explain higher levels of commitment. In contrast, the individual incentive system demonstrated greater goal commitment, with marginal significance. Individuals rewarded based on group performance may have presented dysfunctional behaviors, such as free riding, which refers to the members' slacking, whose reduces its efforts towards achieving the goal when rewarded in a group because they do not consider that their performance is proportional to their earnings potential. Participants prioritized their gains, which overcame pro-social motivations in the decision to commit, a logic contrary to the precepts of social cohesion however aligned with the economic approach. The moderating effect of the goal difficulty (high and low) of the systems on commitment was not confirmed, differing from the literature, which generally associates more difficult goals with greater commitment. Furthermore, the perception of difficulty reveled a negative influence on commitment, attenuated in group incentives, which also points to free riding when they perceived greater goal difficulty. The mediating effect of the need to belong was not confirmed, as it is an intrinsic factor to individuals it did not demonstrate an interrelationship with reward systems to explain joint effects on commitment. But there is a direct relationship, which indicates that the need-to-belong prioritizes the interests of the group and precedes commitment towards the common goal. Results confirmed that task performance is superior when individuals are motivated by group versus individual incentives. Regarding task performance, it is concluded that individuals, when rewarded in a group manner (equitably), were motivated to achieve the group benefit and acted towards the common objective, which explained their greater performance. This may result from social cohesion precepts, in which the union of efforts brings higher performance than the sum of individual efforts. The results together with theoretical assumptions suggest that aspects of social cohesion provide an alternative that can mitigate the negative effects of free riding. Progress is being made by investigating controls that mitigate dysfunctional results in teams, to ensure greater effectiveness of reward systems and goal congruence. For managerial practice, it is revealed that greater commitment motivated by individual gains does not lead to greater performance, as it reflects divergent interests and focuses among members, while group incentive has been shown to align them with the achievement of the common objective, which can explain the higher performance, in addition, individuals perceived the use of group incentives as fairer. This may be the result of greater team cohesion, which makes it possible to mitigate the effects of free riding behaviors.
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| Campo | Ind1 | Ind2 | Dados |
|---|---|---|---|
| Líder | 08160nam a2200289 a 4500 | ||
| 001 - Número de controle | B000105 | ||
| 003 - Identificador do número de controle | BR-FlWIK | ||
| 005 - Data e hora da última transação | 20241007175115.0 | ||
| 008 - Informações gerais | 241007s2024 scba g m 000 0 por d | ||
| 040 - Fonte da catalogação | # | # |
$aBR-FlWIK |
| 090 - Número de chamada local (etiqueta) | # | # |
$aCETD |
| 100 - Ponto de acesso principal - Nome pessoal | 1 | # |
$aPazetto, Celliane Ferraz |
| 245 - Indicação de título | 1 | 0 |
$aSistemas de recompensas e comprometimento com a meta grupal |
| 260 - Publicação, distribuição, etc. (Imprenta) | # | # |
$c2024. |
| 300 - Descrição física | # | # |
$a163 p. : |
| 500 - Nota geral | # | # |
$aDisponível somente em versão on-line. |
| 502 - Nota de dissertação | # | # |
$aTese (doutorado) – Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro Socioeconômico, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Contabilidade, Florianópolis, 2024. |
| 504 - Nota de bibliografia, etc. | # | # |
$aInclui referências. |
| 520 - Resumo, etc. | # | # |
$aEsta tese conduz um experimento para examinar os efeitos do desenho do sistema de recompensas no comprometimento com a meta da equipe, e as influências da dificuldade da meta e da necessidade de pertencer à equipe. O sistema de recompensas influencia a tomada de decisões com base na expectativa de ganhos monetários contingentes ao (i) desempenho individual ou (ii) desempenho grupal/médio. Postulou-se que sob sistemas de recompensas grupal, com divisão equitativa da recompensa, os indivíduos agiriam com interesses voltados aos ganhos grupais, o que resultaria em maior coesão da equipe e explicaria maiores níveis de comprometimento. Em contraste, o sistema de incentivos individual demonstrou maior comprometimento com a meta, com significância marginal. Participantes recompensados com base no desempenho grupal podem ter apresentado comportamentos disfuncionais, como o free riding, que se referem à folga dos membros, que diminuem os esforços face à execução da meta quando é remunerado em grupo por não considerar que seu desempenho é proporcional ao potencial de ganhos. Indivíduos priorizaram seus ganhos, que superaram as motivações pró-sociais na decisão de se comprometer, lógica contrária aos preceitos da coesão social e alinhados com a abordagem econômica. O efeito moderador da dificuldade da meta (alta e baixa) dos sistemas no comprometimento não foi confirmado, divergente da literatura, que geralmente associa metas mais difíceis com maior comprometimento. Outrossim, a percepção de dificuldade demonstrou influenciar de forma negativa o comprometimento, atenuado em incentivos grupais, o que também aponta para free riding frente à percepção de maior dificuldade. O efeito mediador da necessidade de pertencer não foi confirmado, como é um fator intrínseco aos indivíduos não demonstrou inter-relação com os sistemas de recompensas para explicar seu efeito no comprometimento. Mas atesta relação direta, o que indica que a necessidade de pertencer prioriza os interesses do grupo e antecede o comprometimento com a meta comum. Resultados confirmaram que o desempenho na tarefa é superior quando os indivíduos estão motivados por incentivos grupais versus individuais. Quanto ao desempenho na tarefa, conclui-se que os indivíduos, ao serem recompensados de forma grupal (equitativamente), foram motivados a atingir o benefício grupal e agiram frente ao objetivo comum, o que explicou seu maior desempenho. Isso, pode decorrer dos preceitos da coesão social, em que a união de esforços traz desempenhos superiores ao somatório de esforços individuais. Os resultados em conjunto com pressupostos teóricos sugerem que aspectos da coesão social proporcionam uma alternativa que pode amenizar os efeitos negativos do free riding. Avança-se ao investigar controles que amenizem resultados disfuncionais em equipes, para assegurar maior eficácia dos sistemas de recompensas e congruência dos resultados. Para a prática gerencial, revela-se que maior comprometimento motivado por ganhos individuais não leva a maior desempenho, pois reflete interesses e focos divergentes entre os membros, enquanto o incentivo grupal demonstrou alinhá-los à consecução do objetivo comum, que pode explicar o desempenho superior, além do que os indivíduos perceberam mais justo o uso do incentivo grupal. Isso pode ser resultante de maior coesão da equipe, o que possibilita amenizar os efeitos de comportamentos free riding. |
| 520 - Resumo, etc. | 8 | # |
$aAbstract: This thesis conducts an experiment to analyze the effects of reward systems’ design on team goal commitment, and the influences of goal difficulty and the need-to-belong to the team. The reward system influences decision making based on the expectation of monetary gains contingent upon (i) individual performance or (ii) group/average performance. It was postulated that under group reward systems, with equitable division of the reward, individuals would act aligned and interested for group gains, which would result in greater team cohesion and would explain higher levels of commitment. In contrast, the individual incentive system demonstrated greater goal commitment, with marginal significance. Individuals rewarded based on group performance may have presented dysfunctional behaviors, such as free riding, which refers to the members' slacking, whose reduces its efforts towards achieving the goal when rewarded in a group because they do not consider that their performance is proportional to their earnings potential. Participants prioritized their gains, which overcame pro-social motivations in the decision to commit, a logic contrary to the precepts of social cohesion however aligned with the economic approach. The moderating effect of the goal difficulty (high and low) of the systems on commitment was not confirmed, differing from the literature, which generally associates more difficult goals with greater commitment. Furthermore, the perception of difficulty reveled a negative influence on commitment, attenuated in group incentives, which also points to free riding when they perceived greater goal difficulty. The mediating effect of the need to belong was not confirmed, as it is an intrinsic factor to individuals it did not demonstrate an interrelationship with reward systems to explain joint effects on commitment. But there is a direct relationship, which indicates that the need-to-belong prioritizes the interests of the group and precedes commitment towards the common goal. Results confirmed that task performance is superior when individuals are motivated by group versus individual incentives. Regarding task performance, it is concluded that individuals, when rewarded in a group manner (equitably), were motivated to achieve the group benefit and acted towards the common objective, which explained their greater performance. This may result from social cohesion precepts, in which the union of efforts brings higher performance than the sum of individual efforts. The results together with theoretical assumptions suggest that aspects of social cohesion provide an alternative that can mitigate the negative effects of free riding. Progress is being made by investigating controls that mitigate dysfunctional results in teams, to ensure greater effectiveness of reward systems and goal congruence. For managerial practice, it is revealed that greater commitment motivated by individual gains does not lead to greater performance, as it reflects divergent interests and focuses among members, while group incentive has been shown to align them with the achievement of the common objective, which can explain the higher performance, in addition, individuals perceived the use of group incentives as fairer. This may be the result of greater team cohesion, which makes it possible to mitigate the effects of free riding behaviors. |
| 650 - Ponto de acesso secundário de assunto - Termo tópico | 0 | 4 |
$aSistema de recompensas |
| 650 - Ponto de acesso secundário de assunto - Termo tópico | 0 | 4 |
$aMetas |
| 650 - Ponto de acesso secundário de assunto - Termo tópico | 0 | 4 |
$aComprometimento organizacional |
| 700 - Ponto de acesso secundário - Nome pessoal | 1 | # |
$aBauren, Ilse Maria, |
| 700 - Ponto de acesso secundário - Nome pessoal | 1 | # |
$aGómez-Conde, Jacobo, |
| 710 - Ponto de acesso secundário - Entidade coletiva | 2 | # |
$aUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina. |
| 856 - Localização e acesso eletrônicos | 4 | 0 |
$zVersão integral em pdf |